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BEHOLD, THE DAY OF JUDGMENT:
IS THE RICO PATTERN REQUIREMENT
VOID FOR VAGUENESS?
ROBERT D. LUSKIN*
Twenty years of judicial interpretation of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")' has cast a pall of
confusion over the statute's "pattern of racketeering activity" re-
quirement.2 In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,3 four
Justices of the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the depths of
confusion to which the courts have sunk, observing that the major-
ity's muddled exegesis of RICO's pattern requirement "bode[d] ill
for the day" when a vagueness challenge to the statute was prop-
erly before the Court.4
As the British historian A.J.P. Taylor observed, "nothing is in-
evitable until it happens. ' Nevertheless, in the history of RICO
jurisprudence, the "Age of the Vagueness Challenge" surely dawns.
What is astounding is that it has taken lawyers and courts twenty
years to ask whether the statute makes sense. Equally astounding
is that we are about to embark upon a serious debate over whether
a "person of ordinary intelligence" is capable of understanding
terms so opaque that the search for their true meaning has gener-
ated "the widest and most persistent circuit split" in recent times.6
Despite the impressive amount of case law assessing the con-
* A.B. 1972, Harvard University; J.D. 1979, Harvard Law School. Robert D. Luskin is a
partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Powell, Goldstein, Fraser & Murphy. Mr. Lus-
kin was formerly Special Counsel to the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, where he co-authored the Depart-
ment's RICO Guidelines. He now serves as Vice-Chairman, RICO Committee, Criminal Jus-
tice Section, of the American Bar Association.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
2 See id. § 1961(5). A pattern of racketeering activity includes "at least two acts of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter, and the
last of which occurred within ten years... after the commission of a prior act of racketeer-
ing activity." Id.
3 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
" Id. at 2909 (Scalia, J., concurring).
' Hutchinson, Daily Telegraph, Jan. 7, 1980, reprinted in F.S. PEPPER, HANDBOOK OF
20TH CENTURY QUOTATIONS 184 (1984).
6 Northwestern Bell, 109 S. Ct. at 2906-07 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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stitutionality of RICO prior to Northwestern Bell,7 no court had
addressed the vagueness questions raised by Justice Scalia in his
concurring opinion to that decision. To the contrary, the cases re-
jecting constitutional challenges to RICO all derive from a handful
of early cases construing terms other than "pattern of racketeer-
ing," or measuring the intelligibility of the pattern requirement
against definitions that have long since been discarded as overly
simplistic." The first trickle of cases spawned by Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Northwestern Bell promises little more.9 Displaying
either commendable restraint or utter cowardice, depending upon
one's perspective, the courts seem content to duck the issues
squarely raised by Northwestern Bell through a number of avoid-
ance devices. These devices include reliance on "precedent," the
need to review the statute "as applied," or focusing the due process
inquiry on the predicate offenses rather than the terms of the
RICO statute itself.
This Article will first look at the general constitutional doc-
trines governing the vagueness challenges. It will attempt to apply
those standards to the term "pattern of racketeering activity" as it
is now understood. The Article then will consider the various
means by which courts successfully have, thus far, deflected
thoughtful challenges to the constitutionality of the pattern
requirement.
7 See United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38, 41-42 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128
(1986); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 923 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831
(1984); United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 381 (5th Cir.), reconsidered in part, 650
F.2d 651 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 943 (1982); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387,
397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d
1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Hawes, 529
F.2d 472, 477-79 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364-65 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1356-59
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
a See Swiderski, 593 F.2d at 1249 (citing United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903-05
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978)). The Swiderski court characterized the Elliott
decision as "the most persuasive reasoning for finding RICO constitutional." Id. However,
the question addressed in Elliott concerned how directly an individual must be associated
with the enterprise, not the requisite pattern of racketeering activity. See Elliott, 571 F.2d
at 903.
9 See Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F. Supp. 1556, 1581 (S.D. Ohio 1990). The court
found the statute unconstitutional as applied and thus avoided any issue of facial unconsti-
tutionality. Id.; United States v. Paccione, 738 F. Supp. 691, 694-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see
also Beck v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 735 F. Supp. 903, 905 (C.D. IM. 1990) (noting North-
western Bell's determination that "pattern of racketeering activity" is definable).
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I. "PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY": VOID FOR VAGUENESS?
A. The Vagueness Doctrine
Vagueness challenges to criminal laws are grounded in two dis-
tinct constitutional due process considerations. First, the vague-
ness doctrine is designed to ensure that individuals are properly
warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct.10
Chief Justice Warren articulated this "fair notice" rationale in his
oft-cited United States v. Harriss" opinion:
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a
criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed. 2
Second, vague laws are constitutionally suspect because they
delegate excessive enforcement discretion to the Executive
Branch. 13 Justice O'Connor has labeled this danger "the more im-
portant aspect of the vagueness doctrine.' 4 A vague, "standard-
less" law affords too great an opportunity for criminal law enforce-
ment to be motivated by the "personal predilections" of police
officers, prosecutors and juries.' Overabundant discretion also im-
plicates Article III's separation of powers concerns.'" For the legis-
lature to cast its criminal proscriptions so broadly and ambigu-
ously as to allow the courts freely to "step inside and say who
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large,"
would, "to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative
department of government.' ' 7
Taken together, these principles suggest that the task of a
10 See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951) (defendant's two fraud convictions
enough to avoid issue of vagueness of phrase "moral turpitude").
1 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
12 Id. at 617.
'3 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). "[I]f arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those
who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis ... " Id.
' Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
"Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)).
z See U.S CONST. art. Ill.
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.7 (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221
(1875)).
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court presented with a vagueness challenge is inherently subjec-
tive, but relatively straightforward. It would be a grave mistake,
however, to take these principles at face value. While enunciating
broad rules designed to protect individuals from fundamental un-
fairness, courts have resisted the efforts of lawyers to "convert into
a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing crimi-
nal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of
human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning
that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited."'"
The result is a series of doctrines that effectively undercut the
"fair notice" test. As a general matter, the Court consistently has
excused Congress from the burden of enacting legislation of the
highest level of clarity; the existence of less vague alternatives sim-
ply cannot provide grounds for a successful challenge. In practice,
courts have acknowledged the inexactness of language and the dif-
ficulty of line-drawing by holding that due process will tolerate
some vagueness at the frontiers of a statute if "the general class of
offenses to which the statute is directed is plainly within its
terms."19
The courts have glossed the doctrine through a number of spe-
cific devices designed to place ambiguous terms in context, rather
than judge them against objective standards of linguistic precision.
Outside the first amendment context, courts have resisted mere fa-
cial challenges. Defendants must establish that the statute could
not reasonably be applied to their own conduct, rather than that of
a hypothetical defendant. 20 Additionally, courts have relaxed
vagueness standards when a requirement of specific intent works
to reduce the risk of punishing persons who act in good faith,2'
when seemingly vague terms might nevertheless be intelligible to
the class of persons to whom a statute is directed,22 or where terms'
have an established common-law meaning.23
Not surprisingly, virtually any vagueness inquiry, no matter
18 Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
' Harriss, 347 U.S. at 618.
20 See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988) (vagueness challenges to stat-
utes not threatening first amendment interests judged on "as applied" basis); United States
v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1975) (vagueness challenges to statutes not threatening first
amendment freedoms examined in light of facts).
:' See Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 501 (1925).
2 See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Hygrade Provision
Co., 266 U.S. at 502.
" See Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
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how diligent, has a distinctly rudderless quality. The lack of an
articulable standard enables courts to ignore vagueness arguments
and rely uncritically on precedent. Ironically, the doctrine's soft-
ness yields perverse results in practice: the more opaque the stat-
ute, and, consequently, the more confused the courts are about its
meaning, the less likely they are to undertake any rigorous vague-
ness inquiry. RICO jurisprudence demonstrates the possibility for
courts utterly to confuse the meaning of a basic statutory term
such as "pattern of racketeering," while summarily dismissing the
challenges of defendants who claim equally to be befuddled.
B. Implications of Northwestern Bell
Prior to Northwestern Bell, the circuit courts were widely split
on the question of what constitutes a RICO pattern. Their diver-
gent conclusions have functioned effectively to create variant crim-
inal offenses.24 At one end of the spectrum, courts have held that a
pattern could be established merely by demonstrating the perform-
ance of any two predicate acts.25 Under this formulation, RICO ap-
peared to be a purely remedial provision enhancing sentences for
multiple violations of the predicate offenses. Despite its breadth,
the interpretation had at least one distinct advantage: since the
performance of any two predicate offenses exposed an individual
to RICO liability, it cured the pattern requirement of any vague-
ness problems. 26 At the other end of the spectrum, some courts fo-
cused on the Supreme Court's sphinx-like observation in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.27 that "while two acts are necessary, they
may not be sufficient. ' 2s Drawing on the Court's hints about "con-
tinuity plus relationship, '29 these courts struggled to develop more
elaborate definitions of "pattern." A number of circuits developed
2 See, e.g., Blakey, Is "Pattern" Void for Vagueness?, Civ. RICO Rep. 6 (Dec. 12,
1989). 6 (handling of "pattern" after Sedima portends some courts holding RICO unconsti-
tutionally vague).
25 See Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 255-56 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
26 See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159, 162-63 (6th Cir. 1988) (defendant's
RICO conviction reversed since two racketeering acts not found); R.A.G.S. Couture v. Hyatt,
774 F.2d 1350, 1354-55 (5th Cir. 1985) (two alleged acts of mail fraud constituted "pattern"
under RICO); United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1475 (11th Cir. 1985) (defend-
ant's violations of same murder statute three separate times constituted three predicate acts
sufficient for RICO violation), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986).
27 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
Id. at 496 n.14
29 Id. at 497 n.14.
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wide-ranging tests that examined factors such as "the number and
variety of predicate acts and the length of time over which they
were committed, the number of victims, the presence of separate
schemes and the occurrence of distinct injuries."30
Taking yet a different tack, the Eighth Circuit in Northwest-
ern Bell held that a defendant must have engaged in multiple or
separate illegal "schemes" in order to be prosecuted for a pattern
of racketeering activity.31 This approach raised troubling questions
about what constituted a separate "scheme." At the same time,
however, the Eighth Circuit's approach retained some of the binary
simplicity of the "any two predicate acts" approach to pattern, and
dramatically reduced the number of variables to be considered in
determining whether a defendant's conduct satisfied RICO.
Northwestern Bell thus presented the Supreme Court with an
area of the law replete with confusion. The circuits were rather
devisively split, thereby creating a difficult and uneasy situation,
considering RICO's severe civil and criminal penalties. In addition,
Sedima had spawned judicial confusion and uncertainty in dis-
cerning exactly how much more than any two acts was required to
establish a pattern. Terms such as "scheme" and "continuity" per-
sistently eluded concrete explanation, and multi-factor inquiries
proved disturbingly malleable.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, attempted to develop a
more "meaningful concept" of RICO's pattern requirement. 32
Drawing upon the legislative history, he explicitly reaffirmed the
suggestions of the Court in Sedima.s3 He concluded that a RICO
pattern is a function of both continuity and relationship4 The
majority understood "relationship" to mean that the acts have
"the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated . . . and are
11 Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Branden-
burg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1185 (4th Cir. 1988) (factors determining "pattern" require-
ment); Saporito v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 843 F.2d 666, 676 (3d Cir. 1988) (same), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1049 (1989).
11 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
32 Northwestern Bell, 109 S. Ct. at 2899.
11 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text (two
predicate acts sufficient for liability).
34 Northwestern Bell, 109 S. Ct. at 2900. Justice Brennan stated that predicate acts
must "amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity" and also must, in some
way, be related. Id.
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not insolated events. 3 5 In addition, "continuity is both a closed-
and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of re-
peated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into
the future with a threat of repetition."3 6
Justice Scalia, in a separate concurrence, attacked the major-
ity's reasoning. He disparaged the imprecision of the majority's
"continuity plus relationship" concept, contending that it was as
useful to lower courts as advising them that "life is a fountain. 37
Justice Scalia first examined Justice Brennan's description of re-
latedness. Justice Brennan had looked to section 3575(e) to give
meaning to the term "relationship." However, while section 3575
instructs courts and prospective defendants to consider certain
enumerated factors, it provides no guidance as to the nature of the
nexus between the factors necessary to establish "relationship."
Finding a relationship among acts is not a neutral process of cata-
loguing objective similarities and differences. As Professor Gould, a
Harvard paleontologist, has observed, "classifications are human
impositions, or at least culturally based decisions on what to stress
among a plethora of viable alternatives, classifications are there-
fore theories of order, not simple records of nature."38 Depending
on the ordering principle that informs the concept of "relation-
ship," any two acts may-appear related, or not. Without some or-
dering principles, the concept of "relationship" is as elastic as is
possible for a term to be.
Justice Scalia questioned whether it is sufficient that the vic-,
tims of both predicate acts are women.3 9 Or, would it suffice if the
participants in two distinct predicate acts have knowledge of each
other's activities? Factors affecting any particular relationship may
be so numerous and wide-ranging that, standing alone and unex-
plained, they provide little guidance as to what predicate activity
is related for the purposes of the pattern requirement. As it now
stands, prosecutors can pick the most advantageous section 3575
factors, and then simply overlay the level of generality necessary to
construct a "relationship."
The vague nature of the factors outlined by Justice Brennan
" Id. at 2901 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(3) (1988)).
se Id. at 2902.
37 Id. at 2906-07 (Scalia, J., concurring).
38 Gould, Taxonomy as Politics: The Harm of False Classification, DISSENT 73, 73
(Winter 1990).
'1 Northwestern Bell, 109 S. Ct. at 2907 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1990]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
carries the further risk that the concept of relatedness may soon
collapse onto the separate concepts of enterprise or defendant.
Section 3575's vague laundry list suggests that finding a relation-
ship between predicates may simply mean demonstrating no more
than that the same individual defendant committed the predicate
acts or that the acts were related to the enterprise, even if they
were not otherwise related to each other. Therefore, in the case of
so-called legitimate enterprises, the predicate acts, if committed by
employees of the enterprise, will be related to the enterprise even
if the defendants or the acts are not themselves meaningfully re-
lated. Similarly, for association-in-fact enterprises, where the de-
fendants have come together for a limited purpose, the predicate
acts can be seen as related through the defendants, even if the acts
are not otherwise related.
Thus, while the terms "related" or "relationship" may not
themselves be vague, in the sense that they imply something about
the classification of similarities and differences, they are entirely
without meaning. Except for the narrow class of cases involving
repetitive conduct by the same individual, they offer little, if any,
guidance about when or how this element might be satisfied.
Justice Scalia expressed equal puzzlement with the majority's
definition of continuity, finding it even more opaque than that of
"relationship. '40 At first blush, it would seem that any two predi-
cates could be characterized as constituting a "closed period" of
conduct. But the Court clearly did not intend the definition to be
drawn that broadly; predicate acts that fail to extend over a "sub-
stantial period of time" and do not threaten "future criminal con-
duct" do not satisfy the continuity requirement. 41 Justice Bren-
nan's caveat is difficult to understand. In attempting to confine the
concept of closed-ended continuity, ostensibly a retrospective no-
tion, why look to the threat of future criminal conduct? The refer-
ence to future criminal conduct in modifying closed-ended con-
tinuity is all the more confusing, considering Justice Brennan's
initial disjunctive construction; continuity refers either to a closed
period of repeated conduct or to past conduct that projects into
the future with a threat of repetition.42
Finally, taking Justice Brennan's definition on its own terms,
40 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 2902.
42 Id.
[Vol. 64:779
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one must wonder what the phrase "threat of continuity" means.
Justice Brennan has suggested that the phrase refers to those
predicates which naturally lead to predictable repeat episodes,
such as extortion or protection payments.43 However, the line be-
tween continuity and the threat of continuity is illusory; extortion
and protection rackets surely are continuing, not merely threaten-
ing continuity. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine, in any matter in
which the alleged criminal activity is terminated by arrest or in-
dictment, that a prosecutor could not successfully plead the
"threat" of continuity based simply on the fact that the conduct
had not terminated."
The immediate aftermath of Northwestern Bell suggests that
Justice Scalia's skepticism of the majority's attempts to clarify
pattern was well-founded. In Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fi-
nancial Co.,45 the Eighth Circuit stated that "predicate acts ex-
tending over a few weeks or months" does not constitute con-
tinuity,46 but declined to suggest what period of time was
necessary to satisfy the continuity requirement. The court simply
noted that a period greater than three years evinced continuity.
Similarly, in Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion,47 the First Circuit took a
"we know it when we see it" approach and held that activity over a
four and one-half year period was continuous, but that something
less might not have been sufficient.4 s
Finally, some courts have recognized explicitly the futility of
Northwestern Bell. In Management Computer Services, Inc. v.
Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co.,49 the Seventh Circuit found "[North-
western Bell's] explanations of the terms continuity and relation-
ship to be somewhat elastic. ' 50 Thus, Judge Flaum simply con-
43 Id.
"' See id. at 2901-02. The majority's concept of acts that "threaten" continuity carries
with it the further risk that in looking for the "threat" of continuity, courts will focus on the
character or other criminal activities of the defendants, rather than concentrate on whether
the "threat" is related to the conduct of the enterprise's affairs. Id.
45 886 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1989). It would be an interesting, but nevertheless daunting
task to try to classify the predicate offenses set out in section 1961(1), such as extortion or
blackmail, to determine which by their nature threaten continuity, and which, by contrast,
are more naturally sporadic.
40 Id. at 994.
47 893 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1990).
48 Id. at 446-47.
49 883 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1989).
50 Id. at 51; see also Service Eng'g Co. v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1500,
1508 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (predicate acts extending over weeks or months insufficient).
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cluded that continuity properly implicates "long-term criminal
conduct." 51
Judgments of pattern likely will continue to be extraordinarily
ad hoc as the circuit courts continue to fail to lay down workable
rules regarding the temporality of predicate acts. We are left, then,
with little clue as to the meaning of the terms relationship and
continuity. This ambiguity can only perpetuate what Justice Scalia
called the past "kaleidoscope of circuit positions." 52 More impor-
tantly, we are faced with terms whose meaning are elusive at best,
and made even more inaccessible through well-meaning but unen-
lightening judicial intervention.
II. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS AT CLARIFYING THE PATTERN
REQUIREMENT
Given the difficulty and the potential consequences of a seri-
ous vagueness challenge to the pattern requirement, courts have
struggled to find alternatives to explaining the pattern require-
ment in terms comprehensible to the "person of ordinary intelli-
gence." Three alternatives are emerging: (i) reliance on "prece-
dent"; (ii) resort to an "as applied" analysis; and (iii) focusing the
due process inquiry on the predicate offenses, rather than on the
RICO violation. None of these devices, however, will enable the
courts to sidestep a vagueness challenge indefinitely.
Arguments based upon precedent rest shakily atop a handful
of cases which either construe terms other than the pattern re-
quirement or which involve straightforward and mechanical inter-
pretations of "pattern" that have not survived intervening judicial
interpretation. The use of the "as applied" analysis, while sound as
a matter of constitutional law, can do no more than postpone
RICO's day of reckoning. Finally, efforts to focus the due process
inquiry on the predicate offenses are fundamentally unsound both
as a matter of law and fairness.
A. Precedent
By weight of numbers alone, there now exists an impressive
array of authority in at least five circuits upholding various provi-
sions of RICO against vagueness challenges. 53 However, most of
81 Management Computer, 883 F.2d at 51.
82 Northwestern Bell, 109 S. Ct. at 2908 (Scalia, J., concurring).
6' See, e.g., United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 923 (2d Cir.) (RICO not constitu-
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these decisions derive directly from a handful of seriously flawed,
early decisions of questionable utility.
A number of these decisions, construing terms other than
"pattern of racketeering," have emerged as standing for different
and frequently broader propositions.5 4 For example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in United States v. Hawes,55 addressed a narrowly focused
challenge to the term "enterprise, 56 which later was relied upon as
the sole authority to repel a general vagueness challenge. 57 Simi-
larly, the Sixth Circuit relied upon Hawes to deflect a challenge to
the term "racketeering activity, '58 as did the Second Circuit for
the proposition that the term "pattern" was not unduly vague.59
This sort of lateral thinking has continued even after the Su-
preme Court's holding in Northwestern Bell. For example, in Beck
v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,6° an Illinois district court relied upon
both Hawes and United States v. Martino61 to support the notion
that "any person of average intelligence could determine what ac-
tions would make him liable for participating in an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. '6 2
Another group of cases, decided long before the evolution of
the concepts of continuity and relationship, have held that the
tionally vague as applied to illegal enterprises), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United
States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 381 (5th Cir.) (RICO interpretation constitutional if com-
porting with average person's understanding), vacated in part, 650 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1979)
(RICO not so vague as to fail to give notice of illegality of activities), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
927 (1980); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975) (RICO not uncon-
stitutionally vague because of statutory definitions), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
"' See United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38, 41-42 (6th Cir.) (challenge based on vague-
ness of incorporated offenses), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1976); United States v. Hawes,
529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1976) (challenge based on vagueness of enterprise); United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir. 1974) (challenge principally directed to
civil injunctive provisions of section 1964), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
" 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. The court rejected the defendant's argument that only legitimate enterprises were
reached by the statute, and instead held that "enterprise" under section 1962(4) had a very
broad meaning. Id. at 479; see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(4) (1988).
1, See United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 381 (5th Cir.), vacated in part, 650 F.2d
651 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
" Tripp, 782 F.2d at 42.
-' United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980).
1o 735 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Ill. 1990).
61 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir.), vacated in part, 650 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 949 (1982).
" Beck, 735 F. Supp. at 906.
1990]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
term "pattern" is not unduly vague.63 Relying upon the definition
of the term "pattern" found in section 1961, these cases assumed
that a pattern meant simply the commission of at least two predi-
cate acts. For example, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v.
Campanale,6 4 acknowledged with unusual candor that "if unde-
fined, terms such as 'pattern of racketeering activity' would be un-
manageable. '65 However, the court noted that since the term is de-
fined "with reference to a definite number of acts of 'racketeering
activity' within specified time periods," there remains no risk of
confusion."6
This approach has been superseded by the Supreme Court's
elaboration of the pattern requirement in both Sedima and North-
western Bell. No longer will "any two" predicate acts suffice. The
Court in Northwestern Bell expressly stated that the prosecution
must clearly demonstrate "continuity and relationship" in criminal
RICO prosecutions. Therefore, vagueness attacks can no longer be
dismissed in this fashion. Nevertheless, the collapse of this re-
sponse to vagueness claims illustrates that the statutory difficulties
exceed faulty draftsmanship. Although it may have been unwise or
unduly harsh to define "pattern" by reference to a "definite" num-
ber of acts within a "specified period," this provision unquestion-
ably solved the vagueness problem. However, the larger difficulties,
identified by Justice Scalia in Northwestern Bell, are essentially
the offspring of judicial interpretation, originating with the Court's
misconceived "continuity and relationship" approach to limit the
perceived abusive application of the statute in civil cases.
B. "As Applied" Analysis
The strongest deterrence to a vagueness challenge is the judi-
cial doctrine of assessing the constitutionality of a provision only
"as applied." Courts have asserted that while RICO may have
vagueness problems with respect to some hypothetical defendant,
0' See, e.g., United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (where
both defendants had contact with broadly-defined enterprise, statute not unconstitutionally
vague), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612-14
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("conduct [or participation] ... in the conduct of the affairs of the enter-
prise" through a pattern of racketeering activity not vague), a/I'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
Id. at 364.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)).
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if RICO does, clearly and understandably, apply to the particular
defendant who is before the court, the vagueness challenge fails.
Even when defendants have tendered "facial" challenges, courts
have maintained that "the nature of the inquiry that must be
made to determine facial ambiguity is not 'significantly different
from that which must be made to determine ambiguity as ap-
plied. '8 7 Rather, "in determining the sufficiency of the notice[,] a
statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct
with which a defendant is charged." 8 Thus, a fair amount of ambi-
guity around the margins of a statute is insufficient to void the
whole statute, so long as the defendant's conduct can be located
within the discernible core of proscribed conduct.
While unquestionably correct in terms of constitutional law,
the "as applied" doctrine will not pose a permanent obstacle to
adjudication of the vagueness question. Rather, it is likely to en-
sure that the vagueness challenges will be heard in civil cases not
involving activity commonly thought to constitute "racketeering."
Indeed, the first district court decision to uphold a vagueness chal-
lenge arose in precisely the context thought to fall outside the orig-
inal intent of Congress.6 9 Firestone v. Galbreath involved a civil
RICO action brought by a group of grandchildren in the name of
17 United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 444, 461 (D. Del. 1980); see also United States v.
Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975) (absent first amendment considerations, vagueness challenges
"must be examined in light of the facts of the case"); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,
22 (1960) (proscribing declaration of act of Congress unconstitutional "with reference to
hypothetical cases"); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1179 (1st Cir.) (statute not
rendered unconstitutional because of potential uncertainties in hypothetical situations),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 130 (1990).
The courts appear to take "facial" challenges seriously only in the first amendment
context. See United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963) (approach
to vagueness doctrine in first amendment cases "concerned with the vagueness of the statute
'on its face' because such vagueness may in itself deter constitutionally protected and so-
cially desirable conduct"); Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617-26 (Lobbying Act not too vague to vio-
late freedoms of first amendment).
68 National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 33; see also United States v. Parness, 503
F.2d 430, 442 (2d Cir. 1974) ("test is whether the statute conveys adequate warning as ap-
plied in specific situation"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). Consider the recent First
Circuit decision in Angiulo, where the defendants cited Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Northwestern Bell, and contended that RICO's pattern requirement was impermissibly
vague. Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1179. Judge Bownes responded, however, by stating that in
order for the defendants to succeed, they must demonstrate that "persons of ordinary intel-
ligence in the defendant's situation [would not have had] fair notice that the gambling,
loansharking and conspiracy offenses with which they were charged constituted an unlawful
'pattern of racketeering activity.'" Id. at 1178-79 (emphasis added).
"0 See Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F. Supp. 1556, 1581 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
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their late grandmother's estate and family trust against the estate
of her former husband, its lawyers, and accountants, alleging that
the defendants had stripped systematically their grandmother's es-
tate over a period of decades." In holding for the defendants, the
district court emphasized that:
Unlike the organized crime scenario before the First Circuit in
Angiulo, the circumstances of the instant case, which involves a
dispute between family members concerning whether certain
property should have remained in a relative's estate, are in all
likelihood far removed from the typical situations which Congress
envisioned as being within RICO's scope of coverage."1
However, in conducting an "as applied" analysis, courts risk
placing too much emphasis on the identity of the defendants
rather than on whether the term "pattern" provided the defend-
ants with adequate notice of the risks arising from their conduct.
In cases involving organized crime, courts have been quite
willing to find the statute constitutional "as applied," largely be-
cause the defendants were engaged in "precisely the type of activ-
ity Congress sought to reach through RICO. ' '1 2 Although correct,
the discussion of legislative intent seems beside the point; the issue
is not what conduct Congress intended to target, but how success-
fully its intent was translated into legislation. The "as applied"
test in this context should be relatively straightforward: whether
the defendants could have reasonably understood that their activi-
ties constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity. '7' Properly ap-
plied, it is unlikely to give any more notice to an individual engag-
ing in a few acts of loansharking than to an attorney accused of
mail fraud that his conduct forms a "pattern." Nevertheless, the
available evidence suggests that courts will indeed distinguish be-
tween criminal and civil cases, perpetuating RICO's curious juris-
prudential phenomenon of showing considerably more solicitude to
civil than to criminal defendants facing the greater hazards of im-
70 Id. 1565-66.
71 Id. 1581.
72 United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1179 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 130
(1990); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 923 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831
(1984).
11 To be sure, a vagueness challenge may also succeed under circumstances where Con-
gress has not adequately identified the class of persons subject to the statute. See Harriss,
347 U.S. at 618. However, the challenge addressed to the pattern requirement revolves
around whether the term carries any clearly understandable meaning even to those persons
plainly within the ambit of the statute.
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prisonment and forfeiture.
C. A Close Look at the "Predicate Offenses"
Some courts and commentators have suggested that the clarity
of the underlying predicate offenses effectively rids RICO of its
vagueness problems."4 Professor Blakey, an early proponent of the
expansive uses of RICO, wrote that "[a] person convicted'of RICO
lost his innocence when he violated the predicate offense." Accord-
ingly, that person received his vagueness "bite" at that point.
Complaining about RICO itself is asking for "two bites" out of the
"vagueness apple." ' 5 So long as defendants have adequate notice
that the predicate acts comprising the pattern of racketeering are
themselves illegal, Professor Blakey and others contend that de-
fendants can have no legitimate due process objection to a lack of
notice with respect to RICO.
This argument found significant support from the Supreme
Court in Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana.76 The defendants in
Fort Wayne argued that Indiana's state RICO statute, which
closely tracks the federal provision, was unconstitutionally vague
as applied to obscenity predicate offenses.7 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice White responded that "[g]iven that the RICO statute
totally encompasses the obscenity law, if the latter is not unconsti-
tutionally vague, the former cannot be vague either. '7 8
The argument most recently has found acceptance in United
States v. Paccione,9 where the District Court for the Southern
District of New York cited Justice White's observation with ap-
proval. The Paccione court rejected a challenge based on Justice
Scalia's concurrence in Northwestern Bell, because the defendants
7 See, e.g., United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (RICO not
unconstitutionally vague because shifting definition of "enterprise" is necessary in view of
"fluid nature" of criminal associations), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v.
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903-05 (5th Cir.) (defendants did not have greater "notice" problem of
possible criminal liability than under more conventional conspiracy concepts), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 442 (2d Cir. 1974) (interstate
transportation of two cashiers' checks indictable under criminal statute held to be unambig-
uous predicates for section 1962(b) pattern), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United
States v. Paccione, 738 F. Supp. 691, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (mail and wire fraud considered
well-defined predicate offenses).
75 Blakey, supra note 24, at 7.
78 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
7 Id. at 58.
78 Id.
71 738 F. Supp. at 698.
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could not show that the mail and wire fraud predicates were un-
constitutionally vague.80
The approach illustrated by the Paccione court, however, is
inherently flawed. It assumes that RICO does not define a new
criminal offense, but simply provides additional remedies in cir-
cumstances where a defendant has committed a pattern of predi-
cate offenses in the conduct of an enterprise.8 ' From this perspec-
tive, any due process inquiry will involve only the predicate
criminal offenses.
Although RICO operates as a unique type of criminal statute,
it is no less a new substantive offense, different in character than
the predicate acts of racketeering.82 As Professor Lynch has
observed:
In substance, as well as in form, section 1962(c) defines a substan-
tive crime. The RICO offense is not reducible to the predicate
acts of racketeering. If the jury determines beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed those acts, it still must find
an additional element before it can convict: that the predicate
acts were committed in the conduct of the affairs of an
enterprise.83
This additional element has allowed courts to deny claims
arising under the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause when
the relationship of RICO and its predicate offenses is involved.
Courts consistently have held that the government may succes-
sively prosecute a defendant both for substantive offenses and
RICO offenses in which the substantive offenses are pled as predi-
cates.8 4 The courts have reasoned that the double jeopardy clause
80 See id.
8 See United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
940 (1986); Blakey, supra note 24, at 7.
82 See Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 920, 937-39 (1987). The argument that RICO is remedial only makes sense, if at all, in
the context of offenses under section 1962(c). It is certainly true that section 1962(a), con-
cerning the investment of the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering, and section 1962(b),
involving the acquisition of an interest in any enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity, constitute altogether new and substantive criminal offenses. Because RICO defines
a separate crime, it generates disturbing evidentiary, jurisdictional, and venue-related
problems. Id. at 940-41.
83 Id. at 942.
See, e.g., United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 65 (3d Cir. 1990) (defendant acquit-
ted on RICO charges could still be prosecuted for narcotics offenses); United States v. Gray-
son, 795 F.2d 278, 282 (3d Cir. 1986) (Congress intended earlier conviction to serve as predi-
cate act in later RICO prosecution), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987); United States v.
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is not violated by successive or multiple prosecutions precisely be-
cause RICO and the predicates constitute distinct criminal
offenses.
Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that a defendant could be prosecuted for substantive offenses fol-
lowing an acquittal on RICO charges in which the substantive
crimes were charged as predicates. 5 The court found that not even
the same underlying "conduct" was involved in the predicate and
RICO offenses, and concluded that,
the even more complex conduct needed to support a RICO
charge, such as the requirement of both an enterprise and a pat-
tern of activity, constitutes an offense different than and separate
from that encompassed by the narcotics charges alleged here,
even if they were predicate acts or evidence used to prove the
racketeering."6
The double jeopardy implications of RICO's separate and dis-
tinct status strongly indicate that it constitutes a separate offense.
Additionally, this separate status benefits the government by pro-
viding greater flexibility as to statutes of limitations, venue, evi-
dence, and sentencing.8 7
The notion that a criminal defendant has only "one bite" at
the due process apple is deeply troubling from more than a purely
legalistic perspective. In theory, the "one bite" rule would permit
the government to subject an individual to any deprivation of a
right without any notice once he has committed a single offense.
The substantial unfairness resulting from a "one bite" rule is also
evident in typical RICO prosecutions. In some cases, such as those
Persico, 774 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1985) (district judge correctly determined double jeopardy
clause not a bar to trial on pending RICO charges); United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040,
1049-50 (6th Cir.) (double jeopardy not a bar to government using bribery conviction as
predicate offense for RICO violation), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); United States v.
Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1009 n.55 (5th Cir. 1981) (RICO conviction carries no immunity from
prosecution for offenses charged as predicate acts), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982).
85 Esposito, 912 F.2d at 65.
8 Id.
11 See Lynch, supra note 82, at 940-41. A court may even impose consecutive sentences
for violation of RICO and the predicates. See, e.g., United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339,
348 (5th Cir. 1981) (imposition of consecutive sentences for racketeering counts and mail
fraud counts), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983); United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361
(2d Cir.) (multiple sentences imposed on union manager convicted of racketeering and re-
ceipt of illegal payments), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d
564, 572 (9th Cir. 1979) (consecutive sentences imposed for substantive RICO offense and
two underlying acts of extortion), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
1990]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
involving predicate offenses committed in relation to the affairs of
a legitimate enterprise, proof of the existence of the enterprise and
its relationship to the predicate acts may well be a relatively
straightforward approach. In the case of an association in fact,
however, the existence of the enterprise and its corresponding rela-
tionship to the defendants and their acts may be more difficult and
controversial. In either case, the argument that a defendant is enti-
tled to no additional due process protection once given fair warn-
ing of the predicate offenses is profoundly unfair. In the first in-
stance, the defendant who has committed predicate offenses in the
context of a legitimate enterprise has, in effect, receivedno fair
warning that what may fairly be characterized as incidental aspects
of his conduct nevertheless may vastly increase his criminal expo-
sure. In the second case, the "one bite" theory absolves the govern-
ment of any obligation to notify the defendant of conduct that, as
Professor Lynch has observed, "constitutes the essence of the
crime.""
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the day of reckon-
ing for vagueness challenges to RICO dawns. Justice Scalia's con-
currence in Northwestern Bell invites numerous challenges to the
pattern requirement, and perhaps to other similarly ambiguous
terms as well.89 Thus far, the courts have demonstrated an unusual
reluctance to address these constitutional challenges. Perhaps the
extreme difficulty and disagreement concerning the meaning of
RICO's elastic provisions has discouraged courts from confronting
such challenges. Judicial avoidance of the necessary rigorous analy-
sis presented by a vagueness challenge will nonetheless collapse,
because of the weakness of the doctrines the courts have so far
used to deflect scrutiny, or because of the sheer volume of litiga-
tion that Justice Scalia's remarks are sure to trigger.
See Lynch, supra note 82, at 943.
89 See Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 722 (1990)
(outlining challenge to RICO nexus requirement).
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